India is an unintended and uninvited party in the growing tension between Israel and the US. US Vice-President J D Vance, who played a low-key, even invisible, role in the Gulf War, sought to shore up support for his president by reminding Israel that its leaders should be loyal to and supportive of Trump.

However, even his hardened detractors admit and envy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s oratory skills. He is not the person who gives up the opportunity to put others in their place.

In recent weeks, Israeli tensions with the Trump administration over the West Asia crisis and the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz have been palpable. Although both sides partnered in the initial days of the offensive against Iran, escalating Iranian attacks against Gulf Arab states gradually heightened US-Israeli tension.

Without significant consultations with Israel, President Trump concluded an MoU with Iran, with “peace in Lebanon” as a major price for the deal.

However, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not ready to rein in — let alone give up — its militant proxy Hezbollah, which is useful for exerting indirect influence over events in the Gulf. The low-cost proxy keeps Israel on tenterhooks, and its influence in Lebanon — though considerably diminished — remains sufficient to delay any normalisation with Israel.

In the US, Israel's continued engagement and violence against Hezbollah in Lebanon only complicated American efforts to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The frustration was palpable, as President Trump himself has been expressing displeasure with Netanyahu and his sabotage.

Thus, reminding of the role of Trump and his indispensability to Israel, Vance said: “If I were in the Cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.”

Unfortunately for Vance, Netanyahu is not someone who misses an opportunity to retaliate, even if it happens to the US.

Admitting the importance of the US and President Trump’s staunch support for Israel, he firmly disagreed with Vance and told Israeli media: “We have some other friends, like a small country called India. You know, it has 1.4 billion people, and boy, do we have tremendous support there. You know, I have this Facebook thing, and I’m just flooded by the overwhelming support there.”

Behind the taunt

Bibi’s sarcasm about “a small country called India” is a powerful message aimed at the Trump administration. It reminds Washington that Israel is not alone and, in recent times, has made new, dependable friends.

Though such comments about a country being a “friend” are typically used in a bilateral context, Netanyahu is taunting Trump, who is unhappy with some key Israeli actions regarding the ongoing conflict around the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the anger and disappointment among a segment of the Indian political class and foreign policy circles, Netanyahu’s public admission that India is a friend of Israel is accurate.

Since assuming office in May 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has developed a personal rapport with Netanyahu, as evidenced by periodic phone calls, social media posts, festive greetings, and personal visits and meetings in third-party countries.

The testing time for this friendship came after the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023. When the details were still unclear, Modi quickly labelled the attacks “terror” and expressed support for Israel.

Public opinion in the West gradually turned against Israel, and India mirrored this shift as the Opposition focused on the Gaza crisis and the plight of Palestinian civilians trapped in the Israel-Hamas war.

The Modi government remained unwavering and consistently maintained a noticeable tilt in favour of Israel. Not surprisingly, two years later, Modi was vindicated when several Arab-Islamic countries also called the Hamas attack terrorism and demanded the complete disarmament of the militant Palestinian group.

Furthermore, since 2023, India has remained silent on several Israeli actions, including the assassination of several key figures, such as the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. It did not respond to Israel's killing of several Hamas leaders and of Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah. These actions angered a section of the Indian opposition, but Modi was resolute.

Although the Strait of Hormuz is critical to India's energy security, India's supplies come from Gulf Arab countries, not Iran. The perceptible sympathy for Arab countries, such as the UAE, which were targets of Iranian missile and drone attacks, also reflects the convergence of interests among India, Israel, and the UAE.

As Netanyahu told the Israeli journalist: “You have to build new alliances and develop new relationships. That’s what I’m doing right now with India.” One should remember that during his September 2019 election campaign, Netanyahu used Modi’s motif to signal that Israel was not alone.

The strategisation

Befriending Israel does not signal a radical departure from India's traditional approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

New Delhi continues to view and support the two-state solution as the only viable and realistic path to peace and stability in the wider West Asia. At the same time, two major shifts are evident.

First, under Modi, India abandoned the decades-long UPA policy on Jerusalem. During the visit of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in May 2017, Modi reiterated India's support for “a sovereign, independent, united and viable Palestine, co-existing peacefully with Israel”, but carefully omitted East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state.

Secondly, India has been less vocal in pushing for an early resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It has been less active in some recent peace initiatives, such as the Gaza Peace Plan, recognising that the two protagonists — Israel and Palestine — are not ready or willing to make the necessary compromises for an honourable settlement. Unlike some domestic critics and noise, the West Asian countries have a better understanding of India's posture.

Therefore, since Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao established relations in January 1992, Indian-Israeli relations have come a long way. They continue to attract attention, admiration, envy, and consequently, criticism.

Under Modi, they have become the most visible and palpable aspect of Indian foreign policy. Not only has India brought Israel out of the closet under Modi, but it has also de-hyphenated from its support for the Palestine cause, integrated into the larger and changing dynamics in key Gulf Arab states, and been unapologetic. Netanyahu’s public admiration is a recognition of this changed India vis-à-vis West Asia.

The recent conflict in the Gulf over Hormuz highlights two notable aspects of Modi’s policy towards the region: The UAE is vital in the Gulf, and Israel is critical in the wider West Asia. This is confirmed by Netanyahu’s recent subtle yet forceful rebuttal to the Trump Administration.

(The writer teaches contemporary West Asia at Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Note: This article was originally published in Deccan Herald on 12 July 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy