Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s loud silence on the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei in a joint US-Israel military attack has sparked strong comments, criticism and rebuke within the country (India has offered its condolences on Khamenei's death, with Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri signing the condolence book at the Iranian embassy in New Delhi on March 5). Prominent opposition figures see this as an abandonment of moral, ethical and leadership responsibilities. The issue has become a domestic controversy amid upcoming assembly elections, where Muslim voters could play a crucial role in the outcome. Even otherwise informed and intelligent minds do not look beyond the assassination and tend to ignore or downplay the consequences of the Iranian response for the Arab countries.

Modi may choose to make his views public later. But his ‘silence’ at the moment appears logical and is shaped by two main factors: India’s strategic interests with the Gulf Arab states, which are now primary targets of Iran’s counter-offensive, and the demographic makeup of India’s Muslim population.

Even before the international community, including India, could process the news of Khamenei’s assassination, Tehran expressed its anger towards all its Arab neighbours. The stated goal of targeting American bases in the Gulf fell apart when several civilian and non-combatant sites in the region were hit by a barrage of Iranian missiles and drones. Among the targets in the Arab countries were ports, airports, oil terminals, hotels and holiday resorts, which are the prime assets and wealth of the Gulf countries.

The Iranian response was indiscriminate, targeting not just Israel but all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan and the autonomous Kurdish regional government of Iraq. Even Oman, a traditionally neutral power since the 1970s and a strong supporter of Tehran’s engagement with the outside world, especially with the US, was not spared. Qatar, which faced a four-year Arab boycott over its ties with the Islamic Republic, also faced the Iranian barrage. Until now, only Israel has been accustomed to hostile missile and drone attacks and has built a resilient home front. For the Gulf Arab countries, used to wealth, comfort and security, the Iranian actions were shocking and unsettling.

While the Trump-Netanyahu duo unleashed hostilities, the Iranian response is destabilising an area of significant importance to India. Modi could have expressed his deep sorrow and condolences for Khamenei’s killing and could have even used stronger words. He might have done this and more had he not needed to consider the well-being of the nearly one crore Indian expatriates in the Gulf Arab countries.

Any expression of sympathy for Khamenei or perceived sympathy for the Iranian leader would have made it more difficult for Modi to engage with Gulf Arab leaders, who are essential to India’s political, economic, energy and social interests. Indeed, within hours of the Iranian attacks, he called UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and “strongly condemned the attacks” on the Emirates, declaring that “India stands in solidarity with the UAE in these difficult times”. The following day, Modi shared similar sentiments with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and condemned the “attacks on Saudi Arabia in violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Later, he pledged support to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Jordan through personal conversations with their leaders. Notably, his response to the US-Israeli attacks on Iran was different.

Any perceived support for Iran at this moment could have alienated Arab leaders, who were the immediate victims of Iran’s reckless and sometimes senseless retaliatory attacks. The issue is not solely about the safety of Indians in the war zone but also about their long-term presence in the region. Modi likely recalled the 1990 Kuwait crisis and its consequences. In their desperation, Yasser Arafat and the rest of the Palestinian leadership supported Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait. That one mistake proved catastrophic after Kuwait was liberated in February 1991, resulting in about 400,000 Palestinians being expelled by Gulf Arab countries, which lessened the significance of the Palestine issue in inter-Arab politics. This shift paved the way for several countries, including India, to normalise relations with Israel.

Furthermore, the external affairs minister I.K. Gujral’s famous ‘hug’ with Saddam Hussein in August 1990 during the crisis proved costly later. The Arab countries did not forget, and none of the Gulf countries was willing to host Gujral when he briefly served as prime minister during 1997-98.

Secondly, with assembly elections approaching, Modi will also need to pay attention to sectarian divisions within Islam. According to the latest estimates, India has the fourth-largest Shia population after Iran, Pakistan and Iraq. There are about 20 million Shias in India, making up roughly 15 per cent of the country’s Muslim population. Iran has the largest Shia population, and Khamenei has been respected and venerated by Shias worldwide. But the Islamic world does not speak in a single voice. Even regarding Israel, there is no unified stance; for instance, several members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have both formal and informal relations with the Jewish state.

However, the Iranian attacks on Sunni-majority states in the Gulf are likely to reignite sectarian divisions in the region and in India. While Muslims, both Shia and Sunni, might mourn Khamenei’s death, especially since he was killed in a brutal manner, raising him to the status of a martyr like the fourth Imam Ali would not sit well with most Sunni Muslims. The recent home ministry directive concerning pro-Iran rallies and Friday sermons about Khamenei should be understood in this context. Given the attacks on Arab states and their ripple effects on the Indian migrant community and their dependents, Khamenei seems more like a Shia leader than a Muslim one.

The combination of Iranian attacks on Arab states and the Shia-Sunni divide in understanding Khamenei’s killing suggests that the Indian government should be more cautious. If the Gulf states decide to punish those who focus too much on Khamenei’s assassination without addressing the subsequent attacks on Arab countries, labour-exporting nations should prepare for a sudden influx of Gulf returnees.

Foreign policy is not a domain for the weak. Even those who praised Khamenei must realise that the lives of lakhs of their constituents are closely linked to New Delhi maintaining stronger and warmer ties with Arab leaders. India must support the Gulf Arab countries during this crucial time in their history. Like life, foreign policy is rarely about good versus evil. Currently, the Gulf countries, their security and their well-being are far more important to India than mourning Khamenei, who has frequently criticised India over Kashmir and the welfare of Indian Muslims.

Political leaders, foreign policy experts, academics and media commentators can debate the issue endlessly and can even indulge in moral self-righteousness. The inviolability of Iranian sovereignty might seem more vital and attractive than that of Arab sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, governments do not have such a luxury or participate in popularity contests.

The same critics will cry foul if the Gulf Arab countries deport expatriates due to India’s perceived pro-Iran stance. When it comes to the future of nearly one crore citizens, one must think a thousand times before speaking. A single emotional outburst could ruin their lives forever, and trigger related consequences.

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Note: This article was originally published in The Week on 15 March 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy