Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s impending stopover in the UAE during his forthcoming visit to Europe should be a game-changer. His engagement with the Middle East,interestingly, began with his visit to the UAE in August 2015. Although he waited more than a year to visit the region, his selection underscored the Emirates' importance. The time has come to take transformative moves.

Foreign policy engagements face an interesting dilemma. Countries that are geographically, economically, and hence strategically larger are always critical. Several such countries can be identified in different parts of the world. Forging closer ties with such countries is a priority for the South Block. However, it is equally important to recognise that regional powers are less amenable to influence that serves India's interests. Either they are competing powers, or they are courting other powers that are India's rivals. New Delhi’s elbow room vis-à-vis such regional powers is limited and,hence, confined to bilateral relations. Simply put, India cannot expand its relations with other interlocutors through these regional powers.

In the Middle Eastern context, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran are undoubtedly important. It is in India's interest to forge closer ties with these regional powers for both economic and political reasons. At the same time, it is essential to recognise an obvious and uneasy reality: irrespective of the closeness, these countries will not become advocates, promoters, or facilitators of India's interests in the Middle East. Such a course runs counter to their regional calculations and will even diminish their leverage vis-à-vis other great powers. Larger countries tend to have bigger egos that prevent them from being seen as India's cat's paw. If so, detractors, both domestic and foreign, will brand them as India's satellites.

Thus, foresighted leaders identify smaller but reliable countries and bestow excessive interest, attention, and importance on them. This was the strategy of Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s. Much to the consternation of several pundits, he hosted Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as the chief guest at the Republic Day parade in January 1994. Granting such an honour to a ‘tiny city state’ angered several experts, and some even vented their displeasure publicly.

Fortunately for India, these domestic critics failed to grasp Rao's broader calculations. His ‘excessive’ emphasis on the city-state paid off, and Singapore became the champion of India's interests in Southeast Asia. Rather than New Delhi gloating over its importance and economic ascendancy, Singapore became the advocate and vehicle for advancing India's standing and reliability. Before long, Singapore became the pivot of India's Look East Policy, facilitating closer political, economic, and strategic ties with ASEAN, securing memberships in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ultimately contributing to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific community. Without Singapore's help, this journey would have been arduous and even incomplete.

Though delayed, India needs the same approach in its Western neighbourhood, especially in the Persian Gulf region. Countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are important in their own right, and cultivating close ties with them is critical. Yet they will never advocate for the expansion of India’s footprint in the Middle East. Such support would only undermine their influence, something Iran and Saudi Arabia will never contemplate. In some ways, greater Indian influence runs counter to their regional interests and comfort.

India needs to seek a smaller but smarter power that can serve its long-term interests. Bahrain and Oman have limited hydrocarbon resources. Because India's interests in Kuwait and Qatar primarily revolve around energy, India's influence there is extremely limited. Although energy trade is increasing, Iraq faces several domestic and regional problems that hinder its efforts to become India's ally.

Thus, either by design or accident, the UAE is the player that can project and promote India's long-term interests in the Persian Gulf and beyond. Bilateral trade is more diversified, with strong expatriate and remittance components. On several issues, including relations with Israel, both are on the same page. In recent weeks, President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has been seeking to minimise Saudi Arabia's overbearing influence.

Regional powers are important, but their capacity to accommodate India is limited. With determined focus and patience, India should treat the UAE as its principal ally in the Middle East. India could have made the Emirates its pivot in the Persian Gulf soon after Prime Minister Modi assumed office. But neither side was ready then, and the past decade has enabled India to better understand the region and to recognise its friends, allies, and competitors.

So, the time has come to move beyond tentativeness towards the UAE. Frequent political contacts, such as President Zayed's January visit and Prime Minister Modi's upcoming visit later this month, should be used to develop a roadmap that centralises the Emirate as India’s pivot to the Gulf and India's interests within it. This does not imply that India is becoming the UAE’s new security provider, but rather that the UAE is an important component of India's engagements with the Persian Gulf.

Singapore is a successful role model. Will India follow the same path and make the UAE its Singapore to its west?

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Note: This article was originally published in The Week on 3 May 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy