President Donald Trump, never short of rhetorical flourish, has unveiled what he calls a “historic and magnificent” initiative to bring peace to the Middle East through the creation of the Board of Peace, described as a “transitional governing administration”. With himself as chairperson, the Board aligns with his 20-point Gaza plan announced last September and the Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit held the following month. Theoretically, it is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, which endorsed the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force to secure Gaza. A smaller Gaza Executive Board, composed of technocrats, will support the Board.

The goals and composition of the Board reflect the characteristics of the maverick president. Its “charter” is dictated, not negotiated, by the Trump administration and states that “dozens of world leaders” would be asked to join. As some analysts have noted, the publicly available text of the charter does not directly mention Gaza.

The charter calls for “shared burdens and commitments”. Describing the Board as an international organisation, it claims to promote stability, restore reliable and lawful governance and secure lasting peace in regions affected or threatened by conflict. Such a broad scope has raised concerns that the Board, under Trump’s exclusive tutelage, intends to usurp or replace the functions of the UN Security Council. A member of the Board is appointed only through an invitation from the chairman, Trump. Membership begins upon notification that the state has agreed to be bound by the charter, in accordance with Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

All decisions of the Board will be taken by a majority vote but remain subject to the approval of Trump, who also has a casting vote. As the inaugural chairman of the Board, Trump has exclusive authority to create, modify or dissolve any subsidiary deemed necessary or appropriate to fulfil the Board’s mission. In short, the Board is another Trump enterprise, but with international funds and legitimacy. The three-year tenure of the Board ends in early 2029, aligning neatly with Trump’s presidency.

Several countries, including Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey, have already been invited to join. Some countries willing to contribute to the International Stabilisation Force may also receive invitations. Membership lasts three years and can be renewed by Trump. However, countries donating a billion dollars in “cash funds” will become permanent members.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also received an official invitation to join. What are his considerations, challenges and options?

The membership fee is astronomical, and New Delhi is likely to think twice before making such a huge financial commitment. Indeed, India’s financial assistance to the Palestinians through UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) since the early 1950s would amount to only a fraction of the sum Trump is demanding. There is also an awkward twist: if Iran, Hamas or Hezbollah were willing to pay, would Trump invite them to join the Board?

While the Trump plan dominates headlines, jumping on the Trump bandwagon does not serve Indian interests. Beyond his handpicked advisers, Trump enjoys little genuine support. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly unhappy over the inclusion of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Qatari ruler Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani. Although Modi may disagree with Netanyahu over Qatar, both leaders share concerns about Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. Most importantly, the Board is unlikely to improve conditions for Palestinians in Gaza, let alone bring meaningful peace to the Middle East. Yet saying no outright could prove politically suicidal for Modi. He already has several points of friction with Trump over tariffs, Russia, Iran and immigration. Why add more fuel to the fire?

If Modi is prepared to act, several options are available. He could graciously accept the invitation and send a generous thank-you note to Washington. When appropriate and without entering into specifics, Modi could shower lavish praise on Trump’s leadership qualities. Ego-massaging is easy and cost-effective.

When physical meetings take place, a senior diplomat or a junior minister rather than the prime minister himself could represent India. Modi could follow the Sharm summit model where India was represented by Kirti Vardhan Singh, minister of state for external affairs.

Modi could also indirectly blame Trump’s tariff policies for India’s inability to pay the exorbitant membership fee. Since Netanyahu is also unhappy with the Board, largely because of the inclusion of Qatar and Turkey, India could explore Gaza reconstruction through the I2U2 (India, Israel, US and UAE) framework, even without the United States.

India should highlight the reconstruction of Gaza and the Palestinian territories as a key factor for the success of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). New Delhi should actively collaborate with the UAE to promote partnerships and utilise India’s economic support for the Palestinians. It should consider hyphenating the Palestinian National Authority with Jordan, formalising a triangular arrangement and strengthening relations with both. India should also work closely with Israel to ensure the long-term viability and survival of its aid and assistance to the Palestinians.

As tangible steps, India could announce 500 scholarships through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations for Palestinian students over the next five years and commit a US$250 million financial contribution to UNRWA over a ten-year period.

Trump’s Board of Peace does not serve Indian interests. Yet it offers an opportunity to develop and articulate a fresh Indian approach to the Middle East. The question is whether Modi is prepared to bite the bullet.

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Note:  This article was originally published in The Week on 01 February 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy