Described as a ‘pre-emptive’ strike, Operation Rising Lion is the first armed conflict Israel had initiated against a state since the June 1967 War. It is also its first open military confrontation with a state party since the October 1973 War. For the past five decades, Israel fought many wars and conflicts, but all of them were with non-state actors; first with Hezbollah in Lebanon, then with Hamas (with the PLO before Oslo) and for the last few months with the Houthis of Yemen. 

Wars with states are different and complicated, but they are easily recognisable. The targets are military assets and are, therefore, clearer to define and pursue. They would include army headquarters, military bases, strategic assets and even senior echelons of the military establishment. Unlike non-state actors, states do not hide behind civilians; they do not embed their assets among civilians to score public relations points.

At the same time, states are more determined and often are not amenable to external influence, pressures or diktats. While proxies can be pressurised through their patrons, states are different. Whether democratic, monarchical, republican or revolutionary, they are less amenable and receptive to outside influence. More so in the Middle East, where state-regime distinctions are rare, and one thrives on the other. States like Iran have a range of instruments and tools to respond to any violation of their political space, territorial integrity, and policy choices. 

Since 2002, when the first suspicions over the Iranian nuclear programme emerged, Israel has been at the forefront of seeking international actions to stop, freeze and reverse the Iranian nuclear capabilities. This ran counter to the American desire to establish a modus vivendi—something all administrations have been seeking since 1979—with the most important country in the Middle East and an erstwhile ally.

Differing views on Iran and its regional role largely contributed to the personal tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama. Persistent Israeli pressures and threats of unilateral actions partly contributed to a spate of sanctions against Iran. These, in turn, eventually paved the way for the nuclear deal concluded in July 2015. 

Though popular with the Obama administration and Europe, the Middle East was sceptical about the nuclear deal that consciously dodged several Arab grievances against Iran, especially the latter’s involvement in the internal affairs of several Gulf Arab states. Thus, when the first Trump administration decided to pull out of the nuclear deal in May 2018, there was a sense of relief not only in Israel but also in several Arab capitals. This regional disinterest and apprehension partly contributed to the failure of the Biden administration—he was an active player as the vice president of the Obama administration—to revive the nuclear deal.

Interestingly, til the other day, President Trump appeared keen on ‘deal-making’ with Iran without any definite plans for the nuclear issue. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency—the nuclear watchdog—has been raising red flags over Iran’s compliance with its commitments not only to the nuclear deal but also to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran voluntarily signed in 1968 and ratified in May 1970. 

In recent months, there has been a consensus that Iran has significantly increased its enrichment capacity. The 2015 nuclear deal put the limit at 3.67 per cent, but recent reports indicate that Iran has already achieved 60 per cent enrichment by early 2021. The stockpile of this enriched quantity is estimated at over 400 kilograms. The pace and progress of the enrichment make Iran closer to a full-blown nuclear capability.

While several of its neighbours are equally uneasy, the existential threat of a nuclear Iran is acute for Israel. The Iranian theocracy’s refusal to accept and recognise Israel’s existence and protracted support to a host of proxies heightened Israel’s threat perceptions.  

Over the years, Israel recognised that while other countries—including some in the West—might share its worldview concerning a nuclear Iran, they lack the political will to act decisively. As Churchill would remind us, during critical moments, the world needs leaders, not politicians. Unfortunately, the world is suffering from a paucity of leaders who are prepared to bite the bullet and show the way. Thus, nuclear Iran has been reduced to an ‘Israeli’, not a regional, let alone a global, problem.

Left with this indifferent international approach, Netanyahu decided to take things into his own hands and act. And Operation Rising Lion is his response. Going alone is always costly, especially for a territorially small state like Israel. If Iran chooses to drag the conflict—in terms of territories and duration—the cost will mount. 

However, going alone comes with enormous benefits and blessings. Israel is free to select the targets and execute them according to its intelligence information and technical skills available. There are indications that some of the attacks in the initial hours were carried out by special forces located inside Iran. The ground presence is critical both for evading radar surveillance and reducing the lead time against Iranian targets. 

Israel is also free to determine not only the course of the war but also the selection of targets.

In the initial hours, it attacked only high-value military targets and some nuclear facilities. Should the conflict escalate, or if Israel faces more casualties or damages from the Iranian drones, one should not rule out the possibility of Israel going after the Iranian political leadership. 

The words of Tzahi Hanegbi, the head of Israel’s National Security Council and a close ally of Netanyahu, are interesting. He told the Israeli media that “At this stage, there’s no plan to kill” senior Iranian leaders, including Ali Khamenei and others. The key is ’at this stage.’ While military and militant leaders have been the prime focus of Israel’s counter-terrorism strategy, during the Al-Aqsa intifada, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon changed this and went after Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader and one of the founders of Hamas. Thus, if the Iranian drone attacks cause unacceptable civilian casualties or major damages, Israel could shift its approach and go after the political leaders, including the Supreme Leader. 

Above all, acting alone means that, for better or worse, Benjamin Netanyahu is answerable to the Israeli public and only to them. 

The author teaches contemporary Middle East studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Note:  This article was originally published in The Week on 14 June 2025 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy