Is the removal of American forces feasible and helpful for the peace and stability of the Persian Gulf? Several intelligent and well-meaning observers are hampered by their disappointment, discontent, and revulsion towards President Trump and his provocative actions and intemperate utterances. Some could not help rallying around everything Iranian merely because of the latter’s actions and rhetoric against the US. For the ideologues, anti-Americanism and the drive to see and ensure an American ‘defeat’ have become such a powerful logic that they are not even bothered by the cascading effect on nearly one crore Indians who are making a living in the Gulf Arab states.

How did the American presence become so formidable in the Persian Gulf? Energy security considerations, the safeguarding of the political stability of the oil-rich Gulf Arab countries, and the convergence of interests with Israel have expanded American interests and military presence. The spate of regional tensions and violence since the Islamic Revolution has only intensified American involvement in the region.

Today, Qatar hosts the largest US military base in the region at Al Udeid; Bahrain is home to the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet; Kuwait hosts thousands of US troops; the UAE provides logistical support; and there are U.S. bases in Iraq, including in the northern Kurdish region. In addition, Central Command uses facilities in Oman and Saudi Arabia. During the recent conflict, the US moved several naval vessels to the region and its periphery. Britain and France also have naval assets in the Gulf.

The withdrawal of US forces from the region is a long-standing demand of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has come to the forefront in ongoing efforts to secure a ceasefire in the five-week-long war in the Middle East. Tehran views US withdrawal as a precondition for peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. This is both natural and logical. The US military presence has played a significant role in several turbulent developments in the region. Since the removal of the Mohammed Mosaddegh regime and the restoration of Raza Shah Pahlavi in 1953, Iranian nationalists have held a grudge against the US. Since the formal end of the British presence following the June 1967 war, the US has expanded its military presence in the Gulf.

The obvious question is whether removing American presence is feasible or even desirable. Unfortunately, the answer is no. From the outset, the Islamic Republic has been a major security concern for the Gulf Arab states. Beneath its savvy diplomatic posturing, Tehran has never concealed its hegemonic ambitions. As a result, especially since the Islamic Revolution, the US has been seen as a security provider for Gulf monarchies. Though the current conflict has dented that image, the Gulf countries do not have a viable alternative. They cannot find a non-American alternative, nor can they confront Iran individually or collectively.

The recent conflict has only heightened Arab fears of Iranian hegemony. This was the primary reason the wider Middle East was not enamoured with the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration. Many concluded that the JCPOA sidelined Arab concerns about Iran’s regional ambitions and merely formalised Iran’s hegemony. Indeed, the perceived sympathy and understanding in Muscat did not prevent Iran from attacking Omani civilian infrastructure in the early days of the current conflict.

The Iranian clergy who framed and sustained the revolution on an anti-Shah platform hold two contrasting positions. Some often fault the Shah for not asserting Persian historical claims and for easily ‘giving up’ Bahrain in 1971. At the same time, they endorse and reiterate the Shah’s invasion and capture of three islands that belonged to the UAE just hours before the UAE’s independence in December of that year. Over the years, revolutionary rhetoric against Arab monarchies has waned, but Iran’s interference in their domestic affairs has been pervasive. At regular intervals, especially since the Arab uprising in several countries, Iran has been active in fomenting protests by Shias in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. It is essential to recognise that Arab fears of the Shia Crescent are not a Western conspiracy but a reflection of their genuine concerns vis-à-vis Iran. Tehran’s proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—have also been working against the interests of several Arab countries along the Persian Gulf and beyond.

It is too early to say whether unfettered and unrestricted freedom of passage through the Hormuz would be secured solely through negotiations, without further violence. As things stand, the Arab monarchies could export their oil and gas to the outside world only at Iran's diktat.

Under the guise of demanding the ‘departure’ of all foreign forces, Iran seeks to turn the Persian Gulf into an Iranian lake. Its recent strangulation of Hormuz is a reminder of the fate of the Gulf Arab states without foreign presence and support.

The Islamic Republic and its unfriendly policy, rhetoric, and designs against the Arabs are the raison d'être for the American military presence in the Persian Gulf. Any removal of American forces is not feasible without a fundamental change in the Iranian worldview.  

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Note: This article was originally published in The Week on 13 April 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

As part of its editorial policy, the MEI@ND standardizes spelling and date formats to make the text uniformly accessible and stylistically consistent. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views/positions of the MEI@ND. Editor, MEI@ND: P R Kumaraswamy