Atwi Atwi, a high-portfolio official of Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya (AJI) and a former mayor of a municipality in Lebanon’s Hasbaya, was captured in a raid by Israeli forces on 9 February. The incident took place only a month after the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) claimed to have achieved "operational control" over southern Lebanon. It underscores how hybrid political–militant actors are treated as legitimate military targets. This, in a way, also reshapes Lebanese sovereignty and the logic of cross-border deterrence.

Founded in 1964 in Lebanon, AJI (also known as the Islamic Group) was established as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its military wing, the Al-Fajr Forces, came into existence in 1982. Given that this occurred amid Israel’s intervention in Lebanon, it marked a critical moment in the militarisation of AJI’s political project. As the party’s armed wing, Al-Fajr’s deployment in East Sidon represented the first sustained Sunni military presence in southern Lebanon. This military engagement later translated into political capital in the post-civil war period (1975–1990), when AJI achieved its strongest electoral performance, most notably in Beirut and Sidon in the south, as well as in Tripoli and Danniyeh in the north.

Atwi’s capture is the first major field operation of its kind following the expanded US counter-terrorism doctrine established in January 2026 and the designation of the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (along with the Jordanian and Egyptian branches) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). This effectively stripped the group of its political shield, reclassifying its social and municipal leaders as targets.

Further, in the present context, the incident highlights a strategic reality that has been quietly maturing for years: the collapse of the sectarian firewall between Sunni and Shiite militancy in the region, resulting in the formation of a shared operational arena. The Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood or AJI (via the Fajr Forces) has transitioned from a fringe political actor into a functional adjunct of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. Several instances exemplifying this development have already been witnessed since the Gaza war began. Following Hamas’s terrorist attacks in Israel in 2023, AJI’s military wing, the Al-Fajr Forces, carried out rocket attacks from Southern Lebanon on Israeli-held positions on the pretext of seeking revenge for their members' deaths.

At a domestic level, AJI has attempted to reintegrate itself into Lebanon’s political arena. It tries to do so by emphasising electoral participation, a move influenced by shifting regional dynamics—most notably the collapse of the Assad regime and the ascent of an Islamist political model. Simultaneously, AJI has also engaged with political actors of diverse ideological orientations, including the Free Patriotic Movement and the Kataeb Party, through discreet and informal channels of communication.

This hybridity of the civil-military mechanics of AJI can be observed through Atwi, who exhibited dual roles given his status as a civilian leader and a high-ranking operative in Lebanon’s Sunni Islamist landscape. Atwi is alleged to have participated in "Joint Rooms" where Hezbollah commanders and Fajr Forces leadership planned rocket trajectories and infiltration routes. These engagements reflect a calculated effort by AJI to broaden its political reach and consolidate local legitimacy, given the vacuum created by the retreat of traditional Sunni leadership following Saad Hariri’s exit from political life. According to reports, AJI’s involvement in the Gaza conflict appears to have divided Lebanon’s Sunni community, with some endorsing its participation and others denouncing it as counterproductive, claiming that it advances Israeli objectives.

For Israel, this operation signals that it will no longer wait for the Lebanese state to fulfil its disarmament or security obligations. In November last year, Israel carried out similar operations in Beit Jinn, located in Southern Syria, to round up AJI operatives. Previously, in April, a top AJI operative, Hussein Izzat Mohammad Atwi, was killed in an Israeli airstrike. With the capture of a former municipal official, Israel has effectively signalled that Lebanese sovereignty is a legal fiction. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has directed the country’s foreign ministry to coordinate with the United Nations in exerting diplomatic pressure on Israel to clarify the fate of Atwi.

Designated as an FTO and subjected to direct attacks on its senior leadership, AJI now faces constraints on its organisational capacities that parallel those confronting Hezbollah. These shared impediments risk drawing the two movements closer in practical terms, potentially contributing to a further blurring of established sectarian boundaries.

Mohammed Shoaib Raza is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Note: This article was originally published in The Week on 11 February 2026 and has been reproduced with the permission of the author. Web Link

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