

India, Israel and the Davis Cup Tie 1987

By P.R. Kumaraswamy

India's Davis Cup tennis encounter with Israel in July 1987 was an important landmark for a number of political and non-political reasons. Participating was the most controversial decision the Indian government had made since it allowed the incognito visit of Moshe Dayan in 1977 when the first non-Congress *Janata* government was in power.¹ While the tennis match did not bring about any immediate or fundamental changes in India's Middle East policy, it generated new debates over the prolonged absence of diplomatic relations with Israel. Discussion ensued about the politicization of sports and about the need to reexamine India's Israel policy.

Traditionally, the bulk of Indian opinion was not sympathetic toward Zionist political aspirations in the erstwhile Palestine.² Indian nationalists viewed the demand for a Jewish national homeland through an Islamic prism and treated the crisis in Palestine primarily as an Arab struggle against British imperialism. Even though India had opposed the partition of Palestine, once Israel came into being, received recognition from a number of states and gained U. N. admission, the Indian government decided to accept the *fait accompli*. India's recognition of the Jewish state in September 1950 was not followed by formal diplomatic relations, but it did allow an Israeli consulate to be established in Bombay (now Mumbai).

The absence of diplomatic ties did not inhibit either country from maintaining formal contacts and interactions.³ The Israeli consular often met Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the new Foreign Minister. But the Suez crisis and the tripartite aggression against Egypt considerably dented Israel's position and relations began to deteriorate. From the early 1970s, Israel's growing international isolation also contributed to India's adoption of an unfriendly and even hostile attitude. Indeed, when the Israeli consular general made a controversial remark in 1982, he was declared *personal non-grata* and some suggested that Mrs. Gandhi was contemplating closing the Israeli mission.

This provides the changeable political background of India's political policy toward Israel. However, Israel's fortunes were also mixed in the sports arena, especially in Asia.

Politicization of Sports

The post-1945 Cold War rivalry among the camps of erstwhile superpowers influenced, dominated and controlled a number of spheres of human activity. In the post-Cold War era, issues such as emigration, naturalization or commercial interaction became part of political decisions often made at the highest levels. Naturally, then, sports also underwent rapid politicization and all the related is-

sues — ranging from participants to venues — ceased to be the prerogative of the athletes and the bodies that governed sports. Historically, the Olympic Games were aimed at creating comradeship between warring parties, but the modern day Olympics could not revive this ancient legacy and, more often than not, the Olympic Games became political battlegrounds.

The first post-War Olympics, in London in 1948, excluded the defeated powers, namely Germany and Japan.⁴ Twenty-eight years earlier, another set of losers — Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey — had been excluded from the 1920 Games in Antwerp. The Suez Crisis led to Egypt, Iran and Lebanon's boycott of the Melbourne Games in 1956. Protesting the Hungarian crisis, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland also refused to attend the Games. The controversy around the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in Jakarta led to the withdrawal of Indonesia and North Korea from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.⁵

The 1972 Munich Games witnessed the massacre of the Israeli athletes by Palestinian guerrillas and the subsequent withdrawal of the Israel delegation. In 1976, a number of African countries boycotted the Montreal Games because of New Zealand's sports-related ties to South Africa's apartheid regime. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan paved the way for the US-led boycott of the 1980 Games in Moscow, and the Soviet Union retaliated four years later when Los Angeles hosted the 1984 Games. Controversies over North Korea's bid to be co-host plagued the 1988 Games in Seoul.

Israel and Asian Games

The Arab threat of boycott kept Israel away from the Olympic Games until the Winter Games at Oslo in 1952.⁶ Since then, Israel has taken part in all the Olympic Games, in spite of the Munich massacres. However, Israel was less fortunate in Asia and was excluded from the inaugural Asian Games held in New Delhi in 1951.⁷ Israel⁸ entered the second Asian Games at Manila and has participated sporadically since then [see table, facing page]. In 1962, Indonesia, the world's largest Islamic nation, refused to invite Israel to the fourth Asian Games at Jakarta. The Indian vice-president of the Asian Games Federation, Guru Datt Sondhi, who was also a member of the International Olympic Committee, deplored this decision. Enraged by his condemnation, a 20,000-person mob surrounded and attacked the Indian embassy in Jakarta.⁹ To complicate the controversy, in 1963 Indonesia organized the Games for the new emerging forces, which excluded athletes from both Israel and Taiwan.

The 1974 Asian Games in Teheran were important in a number of ways. Iran hosted the Games soon after the dramatic, short-lived Arab oil embargo against the U.S. and the Netherlands for their support of Israel during the October 1973 war. The Shah of Iran, who had maintained close, cordial and even strategic relations with Israel since the 1950s, was unperturbed about the boycotts. Israel, which

sent a strong contingent to Tehran, won 19 medals; it stood sixth in the final medal tally and India stood seventh. While Bahrain and Kuwait took part in the Games, the other Arab countries were conspicuous by their absence. However, bowing to the Arab boycott threat at the end of the Tehran games, the Asian Games Federation decided to exclude Israel from the next Games in Bangkok and, then, India offered to host the ninth Asian Games.

In 1981, India argued that the "security of the participants and smooth holding of the Games" would be the paramount considerations in deciding upon participating nations.¹⁰ Toward the end of the year, India pointed out that the rules "of the Asian Games Federation do not state specifically that the Indian Olympic Association is bound to extend formal invitation to all members of the Federation."¹¹ Citing security considerations, India excluded Israel from the 1982 New Delhi Games. The participants were not satisfied with this informal arrangement and went on to change the name and charter of the Asian Games Federation, the organizing body of the Games. The newly formed Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) excluded countries whose membership "would not be conducive" to the organization of the Games. Thus, Israel was officially expelled from the supreme sports body of Asia,¹² and was thereby excluded from the tenth Asian games in Seoul in 1986.¹³

India-Israel Sports Encounters

This background supplies a better understanding of India's position in general and its tie to the Davis Cup in particular. India's sports policy toward Israel operated at two different levels. At the individual level, Indians competed with Israelis without any inhibitions or controversies. Vijay Amritaraj, India's tennis

Israel and the Asian Games

1951	New Delhi	Not invited
1954	Manila	2G 1S 1B
1958	Tokyo	— — 1B
1962	Jakarta	Not invited
1966	Bangkok	6G 6S —
1970	Bangkok	Not invited
1974	Tehran	7G 4S 8B
1978	Bangkok	Not invited
1982	New Delhi	Not invited and suspended from OCA
1986	Seoul	Not invited

icon, played in the Israeli Grand Prix in Tel Aviv in October 1985.¹⁴ Ramesh Krishnan lost two previous encounters against Shlomo Glickstein, who later came to India to break the Davis Cup tie.¹⁵

After the Davis Cup tie breaking match, another Indian played against an Israeli, but the contest went unnoticed. Vishwanathan Anand, the World Junior Chess Champion, who later became a Grand Master, met Gad Rechis of Israel in his last match before clinching the title in the Philippines in August 1987.¹⁶ Moreover, Indian Jews have been participating in Israel's *Maccabia* Games.¹⁷

At the national level, Indians felt no initial reluctance about competing against Israel. In tune with the generally favorable attitude toward Israel in the mid-twentieth century, the two countries' sports teams encountered each other quite a few times. An Israeli football team participated in the Asian Cup's qualifying tournament in Ernakulam (Kerala) in December, 1959. In 1964, a team from India went to Tel Aviv for the final round of the Asian Cup, where it lost to the hosts, the eventual winner. In the 1972 pre-Olympic football match in Rangoon, Israel defeated India by a solitary goal.¹⁸ Besides these direct encounters, India and Israel both participated in a number of international meets such as the Olympic Games.

However, spearheaded by the oil crisis, the post-1973 era saw the growing influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and spreading international concerns about it, combined with Israel's increasing isolation, especially by the Third World.¹⁹ India's position also underwent a change, going from unfriendliness to an almost hostile stance toward the Jewish state. India's political attitude was apparent when it supported the notorious U.N. General Assembly resolution, which declared, "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

This attitude percolated into the arena of sports. India hosted two international table tennis meets that amply testify to its attitude toward Israel. First, India hosted the 1975 World Table Tennis Championship at Calcutta. In spite of the personal intervention of Roy H. Evans, President of the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), India refused to allow Israel to participate. The Israeli team came to Calcutta, was denied entry visas and was sent back. An official of the Indian Table Tennis Federation (ITFI) noted, "It is necessary to understand the sport life of a country in relation to the country's overall policies."²⁰ In March 1975, the government of India explained its stand to *Rajya Sabha*, the Upper House of the Indian Parliament:

The Table Tennis Federation of India, which organized the Tournament, did not extend an invitation to Israel to participate in the 33rd World Table Tennis Tournament in Calcutta. Since the Israeli team was not invited, there was no question of issuing a visa for this purpose.²¹

Twelve years later, New Delhi hosted the 39th World Championship and the question of Israel's participation once again became controversial. Israel was invited to the tournament, but its team members were denied entry visas. To avoid controversy, the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), the sport's parent body, took on the task of inviting affiliated nations.²² However, Table Tennis Federation of India (TTFI) President I.S. Bindra argued that when the championship was allotted to India in 1983 and, thereafter, it was made clear that entry visas for Israeli players would be the sole prerogative of the Indian government.²³ An official TTFI spokesman earlier declared, "If the ITTF have extended an invitation to the Israelis, the TTFI it not responsible for it."²⁴ However, at the biennial annual general meeting, Bindra observed that an invitation had been sent to Israel as per the constitution and the TTFI had nothing to do with the Indian government's policy towards any particular country.²⁵

Intervention by the ITTF, the parent body and a few other countries did not improve the situation. West Germany protested Israel's exclusion and Swedish Minister of Sports Ulf Lonnqvist boycotted the Championship.²⁶ At the annual meeting held in New Delhi, the Netherlands — strongly backed by West Germany — proposed that India should not be allowed to host any international table tennis meets until it would ensure the participation of all member states.²⁷ In the wake of India's decision, Israel unsuccessfully tried to change the venue of the Championship. Samuel Larkin, the Secretary-General of the Israeli Sports Federation, declared, "We find it beyond our understanding that the ITTF awarded India the 39th Championship, knowing that it previously barred Israeli teams from the events."²⁸

Why did India ban Israel from participating in international sports meets held in its borders? India's rationale revolves around an April 1985 government notification that came to light just before it decided to host the Davis Cup in 1987. The policy guidelines of the Indian Department of Youth Affairs and Sports declared that any proposal, "to send Indian teams abroad to participate in international tournaments or for holding international tournaments in India must clearly state whether countries such as South Africa, Israel or Taiwan are eligible to participate in the Tournament and whether they are likely to participate." Under such circumstances, the guidelines added, the Indian team would be denied permission.²⁹ However, the Indian government lacked foresightedness on this issue, as proven by subsequent events. Taiwan, for example, participated in both the men's and the women's sections of the 1987 New Delhi Table Tennis Championship and in the women's section, it played against India.³⁰

The Davis Cup Tie

These developments, declarations and directives make the Davis Cup match controversial. India reached the finals only once, in 1974, when it gave South

Africa a walkover victory over the apartheid issue.³¹ From 1981 — when the pattern of world grouping was introduced — India qualified annually for the honor from the Asian zone, except in 1983. Israel qualified for the European Zone only once, in 1986.³² Israel was included in the European zone, not the Asian one, for political rather than geopolitical reasons.³³

Israel's qualification in 1986 made Indo-Israeli encounters "a live possibility." When India met Argentina in March 1987, a victory was considered essential *inter alia*, so India could avoid playing against Israel in the next round.³⁴ Czechoslovakia, which simultaneously took on Israel, was expected to be India's opponent in that round. With this in mind, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi observed, "If you don't wish to play against Israel, all you have to do is beat the Argentines."³⁵ However, the pre-quarter finals saw four major upsets: Israel defeated Czechoslovakia, Spain beat West Germany, Paraguay defeated the U.S. and India won over Argentina. Thus, in its next encounter, India was fated to compete against Israel.

According to International Tennis Federation (ITF) rules, which govern the Davis Cup, a country hosting a second round match has to inform the ITF of the venue of the match within a month after the completion of the first round match.³⁶ However, India conveyed its decision to the ITF as late as May 20, more than two months after the first round match. This inordinate delay reveals the complicated nature of the decision. During the interim period, India tried to create a face saving formula. As early as March 17, Israel expressed its willingness in view of past experience to play India in a neutral country.³⁷ Israel even suggested England as a possible venue.³⁸ However, Davis Cup rules permit neutral venues only in the case of a natural calamity and not because of any political animosity.³⁹

Under these circumstances, hosting the match would give the Indian team a home court advantage and a grass court. India's decision has been explained two ways, both of which need scrutiny. First, in terms of being allowed to compete in India, it was widely argued that Israel and South Africa were different cases. Highlighting this, former union minister C. Subramaniam pointed out:

The boycott of South Africa and its exclusion from all international competitive sports and games are beyond doubt powerful sanctions. There is no such exclusion in the case of Israel.⁴⁰

Likewise, Vijay Amritaraj argued, "There is no way you can compare this situation to South Africa. This is a different issue."⁴¹ By its actions, the Indian government seemed to have accepted this distinction and, thereby, apparently questioned its own April 1985 guidelines.

Second, the media began to highlight a number of sports contacts between Israel and other countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations. Israel

played against Czechoslovakia in Prague and the USSR in Moscow. And, in the absence of diplomatic relations, China had participated in and even dominated the Seoul Asian Games. Hence proponents asserted that India's decision was neither new nor unprecedented.⁴²

In January 1987, Israel cited these and similar examples to convince India to invite its team to the 39th World Table Tennis Championship.⁴³ In that event, India refused to accept any such precedents for reconsidering its decision against Israel's participation. Why were the things different for the Davis Cup?

Rationales

Describing the decision of the Indian government as a victory for one or another lobby⁴⁴ would be easy and simplistic. The reality was rather complex. The primary factor behind the favorable decision was the possibility that India would win the Davis Cup.

India first entered the Davis Cup in 1922, but it reached the finals only once, in 1974, when it refused to play against South Africa because of the issue of apartheid. In that instance, South Africa won the title by default. Since Indian tennis was dependent upon an aging trio — Vijay Amritaraj, Anand Amritaraj and Ramesh Krishnan — it had no bright prospects of advancing further if it defaulted again. As Amritaraj observed, "This (the match against Israel) might be our last big chance to go some distance in Davis Cup."⁴⁵ True to these words, India lost the finals to Sweden.

Second, any other Indian decision would have seriously crippled Indian tennis because of the ITF's strict adherence to the rules and regulations. In September 1986, for example, India's team — at the behest of its government — pulled out of the semi-finals of the Asian Zone's Boys qualifying competition in Hong Kong. Topping Group B, India was to have met Israel, the runner-up in Group A. The ITF did not take the decision to pull out kindly and suspended India for one year from the World Youth Cup, the team tennis championship for under-16s.⁴⁶ Any Indian default over the Davis Cup match with Israel would have attracted even more stringent penalties, including a three-year disqualification and a \$10,000 fine. Furthermore, after the three-year ban, India would have to play in the qualifying matches and would have to promise to abide by Davis Cup regulations in the future and to keep politics separate from sports.⁴⁷ In short, the ITF's regulations acted as a strong deterrent of any Indian refusal to play against Israel.

Third, analysts cannot ignore the effect of public opinion about hosting the match. None other than Vijay Amritaraj spearheaded lobbying in favor of the match. His personal efforts and persuasion at the highest level undeniably affected the outcome in large measure. Israeli Tennis Association chairman David Harnik declared, "Vijay played a prominent role in getting the Indian government's approval."⁴⁸

Fourth, various prominent public figures campaigned in favor of the match. Aging Congress leader C. Subramaniam, a former president of the All India Tennis Association (AITA), took an active part throughout this period. He picked up the lots for the fixture, an honor normally given to prominent leaders of the government. While recalling examples of Socialist countries that played against Israel, he went on to question India's basic policy toward the Middle East.⁴⁹ AITA, which only a few years earlier had refused to bid for a grand prix tournament due to Israel's participation, joined the campaign, as did Jaideep Singh, member of Parliament and president of the Amateur Athletic Federation of India.⁵⁰ Even the public at large supported the match, as confirmed by an opinion poll conducted shortly before the government announced its decision. At the national level, 47.1% favored the match, 20.6% were against it and 32.3% expressed no opinion. The support was much larger in South India.⁵¹

Fifth, the Arab world was preoccupied with a number of internal and intra-regional issues. With the Iran-Iraq war looming larger, Indian decision-makers believed that a strong Arab reaction was only a remote possibility. Arab inaction or unwillingness to act against Israel's security relations with Sri Lanka pointed in this direction.⁵² Morocco, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan's decision to restore diplomatic ties with Egypt in spite of the Camp David agreement clearly indicated that the Arab world was not united against Israel. Only the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Chedli Klibi, had come out strongly against the Indian decision.⁵³ The PLO expressed surprise at the approval. The PLO Ambassador in India, Khaled al-Sheikh, felt that the Indian government could have informed his mission about the decision and declared "the decision to play Israel will certainly harm India's position as one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement."⁵⁴ In spite of his rhetoric, the Arab reaction was indifference.

One might be tempted to suggest that hosting the match was a pragmatic decision aimed at de-linking sports and politics, but subsequent developments do not give credence to this conclusion. The inordinate delay involved in making the decision only amplified the political inputs. If the media reports were to be believed, the final decision was made in a closed door meeting of the Cabinet Committee of Political Affairs (CCPA), the Indian government's highest decision-making body. This only belittles the claims that sports were de-politicized.⁵⁵ Moreover, India refused to play a Davis Cup relegation fixture in Israel the following year, citing the on-going *intifada*.

Conclusion

Unlike 'Ping-Pong' diplomacy, the July 1987 Davis Cup tennis tournament did not lead to any significant or even subtle change in India's policy vis-à-vis Israel. At the same time, it did become part of a subtle change of nuance adopted by Rajiv Gandhi, who took over as Prime Minister in October 1984.⁵⁶ Unlike his

predecessors, he encouraged contacts and interactions with Israeli leaders as well as with pro-Israeli elements in the U.S. In 1985, he met with his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres in New York during a U.N. session. Three years later, in June 1988, he held a highly publicized meeting with U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz.⁵⁷ Full normalization of relations, however, had to wait until January 1992.

Seen in this context, the Davis Cup match did not indicate any change in India's policy toward Israel. Moreover, India played against Israel in the 1983 and 1985 World Table Tennis Championships. The decision, therefore, appears to have been a pragmatic one, born out of the larger interests of Indian sports. Outwardly, it seems in tune with India's consistent support of the Arabs, but the controversy generated a lively debate on the need to re-evaluate India's policy toward Israel.

Various developments, such as growing Arab moderation toward Israel, Israel's acceptance by the international community, increasing Israeli contacts with socialist countries and growing Israeli attempts in this direction indicate the possibility of a change in India's attitude. For weeks, the controversy over the tennis fixture dominated the front pages of the newspaper. However, the onset of the *intifada* the year after the Davis Cup match significantly undermined at least some of the goodwill toward Israel that was generated during the Davis Cup controversy.

Notes

1. For a first person account see, Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), pp. 26-29.

2. For a detailed discussion see, India, Ministry of External Affairs, *India and Palestine: The Evolution of a Policy*, (New Delhi, nd.); M.S. Agwani, "India and Palestine," in *Man and Development*, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1983, pp. 31-37; Surjit Singh, "Indo-Israeli relations: A study of some aspects of India's foreign policy," *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. 57, Nos. 2-3, August-December 1979, pp. 387-399; G.H. Jansen, *Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism*, (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization, 1971); and Gideon Shimoni, *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy toward Israel*, (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1977).

3. P.R. Kumaraswamy, "India and Israel: Prelude to Normalisation," in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 1995, pp. 53-73.

4. *Indian Express* (New Delhi), May 10, 1984.

5. This follows the decision of the International Olympic Committee to ban any team that had competed in the 1963 GANEFO, which excluded Israel and Taiwan.

6. Indeed Israel applied for membership for the Summer Olympics at London held in 1950. Interestingly, by then India had recognized the Jewish State.

7. *Israel Yearbook, 1954*, (Jerusalem), p.132.
8. Ron Hendricks, "A sentimental journey," *Indian Express*, Nov.12, 1984.
9. India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Series VII, Vol. 43, August 20, 1981, col. 251.
10. India, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. CXX, No. 5, November 27, 1981, cols. 179-180.
11. In 1976, the Asian Football Confederation amended its constitution and revoked Israel's membership. *Asian Recorder*, (New Delhi), October 16-20, 1976, p.13408.
12. Israel unsuccessfully tried to enter the OCA at Seoul. *Indian Express*, April 22, 1986.
13. Ritu Sarin, "Is the promised land out of bounds?," *Sunday*, (Calcutta), November 10-16, 1985, pp. 56-57.
14. *Sunday Mail*, (New Delhi), July 19-25, 1987.
15. The match against Rechis was described as Anand's toughest tie in the tournament.
16. R.K. Srivastava, "India-Israel relations," in *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 5, July-September 1970, p. 260.
17. *Indian Express*, July 21, 1987.
18. The 1970s saw a number of African countries breaking off their diplomatic ties with Israel.
19. *The Jerusalem Post*, February 9, 1975.
20. India, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. XCI, March 7, 1975, col. 72.
21. This might be due to the experience in 1975 for the Calcutta tournament when the Indian body refused to invite Israel.
22. *The Hindu*, (New Delhi), January 13, 1987.
23. *Indian Express*, January 10, 1987.
24. *Indian Express*, February 23, 1987.
25. *The Hindu*, February 13, 1987; and *Indian Express*, February 3, 1987.
26. *Indian Express*, February 23, 1987.
27. *Indian Express*, January 28, 1987. Israel even contemplated sending a team to New Delhi as it did in 1975. Finally, it was content with lodging a protest with the ITTF.
28. *Indian Express*, February 15, 1987 and February 16, 1987.
29. *Sunday*, June 21-27, 1987, pp. 24-25.
30. In the women's section, India was grouped together with Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Nepal.
31. For more details on the Davis Cup and India see, R.T. Shahani, "India, Israel and a cup to covet," in *Illustrated Weekly of India*, July 5, 1987, pp. 38-39.
22. *The Hindu*, July 24, 1987.
33. This is true of most of the other international organizations where Israel

has been clubbed in the European zone.

34. T. R. Ramakrishnan, "Davis Cup drew favors India," in *India Express*, March 13, 1987.

35. Quoted in *Sunday*, June 21-27, 1987, p. 21.

36. *The Hindu*, April 16, 1987. The AITA asked for and obtained an extension of the deadline by a month.

37. *Indian Express*, March 18, 1987.

38. *The Hindu*, July 19, 1987.

39. *The Hindu*, May 21, 1987.

40. For the complete text of his statement see, *The Hindu*, March 28, 1987.

41. *The Hindu*, March 20, 1987.

42. *The Hindu*, May 21, 1987.

43. *Indian Express*, January 28, 1987.

44. The India media portrayed the decision as a victory for the pro-Israeli and pro-western lobby. For example, see, *Sunday*, June 21-27, 1987, pp. 25-27.

45. *The Hindu*, March 19, 1987.

46. *Indian Express*, September 23, 1986 and March 5, 1987.

47. *The Hindu*, May 21, 1987.

48. *The Hindu*, July 19, 1987. For similar views see, *Sunday*, June 21, 1987, pp. 21, 26-27.

49. *The Hindu*, March 28, 1987.

50. *Indian Express*, April 25, 1987.

51. For details, see *The Hindu*, May 23, 1987. The top three tennis players being South Indians perhaps explain the higher degree of support for the fixture.

52. For details see, P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Israeli connections to Sri Lanka," *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), February 1987, pp.1341-1355.

53. F. J. Khergamvala, "Arabs indifferent to India playing Israel?," *The Hindu*, May 27, 1987.

54. Quoted in *Sunday*, June 21, 1987, p. 27.

55. *Sunday*, p. 25.

56. "India and Israel."

57. "Leak to media by Jewish leader aborts improvement of India-Israel status," *Middle East Times*, 23-29 July 1988; "Jewish leaders and Solarz meet Gandhi," *India Abroad*, 17 June 1988; M.J. Akbar, "New York diary," *Telegraph* (Calcutta), 12 June 1988; Luswina Joseph, "Solarz gushes over thaw in Indo-Israeli ties," *Pioneer*, 31 January 1992; and Jesse N. Hordes, "Is India rethinking its policy on Israel?" *ADL Bulletin*, Vol. 46, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 3-5.